[dpdk-dev] Having troubles binding an SR-IOV VF to uio_pci_generic on Amazon instance

Gleb Natapov gleb at scylladb.com
Fri Oct 2 17:56:08 CEST 2015


On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 05:00:14PM +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 02:02:24PM -0700, Alexander Duyck wrote:
> > validation and translation would add 10s if not 100s of nanoseconds to the
> > time needed to process each packet.  In addition we are talking about doing
> > this in kernel space which means we wouldn't really be able to take
> > advantage of things like SSE or AVX instructions.
> 
> Yes. But the nice thing is that it's rearming so it can happen on
> a separate core, in parallel with packet processing.
> It does not need to add to latency.
> 
Modern nics have no less queues than most machines has cores. There is
no such thing as free core to offload you processing to, otherwise you
designed your application wrong and waste cpu cycles.

> You will burn up more CPU, but again, all this for boxes/hypervisors
> without an IOMMU.
> 
> I'm sure people can come up with even better approaches, once enough
> people get it that kernel absolutely needs to be protected from
> userspace.
> 
People should not "get" things which are, lets be polite here, untrue.
The kernel never tried to protect itself from userspace rumning on
behalf of root. Secure boot, which is quite recent, is may be an only
instance where kernel tries to do so (unfortunately) and it does so by
disabling things if boot is secure. Linux was always "jack of all
trades" and was suitable to run on a machine with secure boot and a vm
that acts as application container or embedded device running packet
forwarding.

the only valid point is that nobody should debug crashes that may be
caused by buggy userspace and tainting kernel solves that.

> Long term, the right thing to do is to focus on IOMMU support. This
> gives you hardware-based memory protection without need to burn up CPU
> cycles.
> 
> -- 
> MST

--
			Gleb.


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