[dpdk-dev] [PATCH v3 2/2] examples/ipsec-secgw: add target queues in flow actions

Anoob Joseph anoob.joseph at caviumnetworks.com
Wed Dec 13 14:53:19 CET 2017


Hi Nelio,


On 12/13/2017 06:23 PM, Nelio Laranjeiro wrote:
> Hi Anoob,
>
> On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 05:08:19PM +0530, Anoob Joseph wrote:
>> Hi Nelio,
>>
>>
>> On 12/13/2017 03:32 PM, Nelio Laranjeiro wrote:
>>> Hi Anoob,
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 12:11:18PM +0530, Anoob Joseph wrote:
>>>> Hi Nelio,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/12/2017 08:08 PM, Nelio Laranjeiro wrote:
>>>>> Hi Anoob,
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 07:34:31PM +0530, Anoob Joseph wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Nelio,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/12/2017 07:14 PM, Nelio Laranjeiro wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi Anoob,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 06:13:08PM +0530, Anoob Joseph wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi Nelio,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 12/11/2017 07:34 PM, Nelio Laranjeiro wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Mellanox INNOVA NIC needs to have final target queue actions to perform
>>>>>>>>> inline crypto.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Nelio Laranjeiro <nelio.laranjeiro at 6wind.com>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Changes in v3:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>       * removed PASSTHRU test for ingress.
>>>>>>>>>       * removed check on configured queues for the queue action.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Changes in v2:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>       * Test the rule by PASSTHRU/RSS/QUEUE and apply the first one validated.
>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>       examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>>>>>       examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h |  2 +-
>>>>>>>>>       2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.c
>>>>>>>>> index 17bd7620d..1b8b251c8 100644
>>>>>>>>> --- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.c
>>>>>>>>> +++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.c
>>>>>>>>> @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ create_session(struct ipsec_ctx *ipsec_ctx, struct ipsec_sa *sa)
>>>>>>>>>       							rte_eth_dev_get_sec_ctx(
>>>>>>>>>       							sa->portid);
>>>>>>>>>       			const struct rte_security_capability *sec_cap;
>>>>>>>>> +			int ret = 0;
>>>>>>>>>       			sa->sec_session = rte_security_session_create(ctx,
>>>>>>>>>       					&sess_conf, ipsec_ctx->session_pool);
>>>>>>>>> @@ -201,15 +202,67 @@ create_session(struct ipsec_ctx *ipsec_ctx, struct ipsec_sa *sa)
>>>>>>>>>       			sa->action[0].type = RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_SECURITY;
>>>>>>>>>       			sa->action[0].conf = sa->sec_session;
>>>>>>>>> -			sa->action[1].type = RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_END;
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>       			sa->attr.egress = (sa->direction ==
>>>>>>>>>       					RTE_SECURITY_IPSEC_SA_DIR_EGRESS);
>>>>>>>>>       			sa->attr.ingress = (sa->direction ==
>>>>>>>>>       					RTE_SECURITY_IPSEC_SA_DIR_INGRESS);
>>>>>>>>> +			if (sa->attr.ingress) {
>>>>>>>>> +				uint8_t rss_key[40];
>>>>>>>>> +				struct rte_eth_rss_conf rss_conf = {
>>>>>>>>> +					.rss_key = rss_key,
>>>>>>>>> +					.rss_key_len = 40,
>>>>>>>>> +				};
>>>>>>>>> +				struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev;
>>>>>>>>> +				union {
>>>>>>>>> +					struct rte_flow_action_rss rss;
>>>>>>>>> +					struct {
>>>>>>>>> +					const struct rte_eth_rss_conf *rss_conf;
>>>>>>>>> +					uint16_t num;
>>>>>>>>> +					uint16_t queue[RTE_MAX_QUEUES_PER_PORT];
>>>>>>>>> +					} local;
>>>>>>>>> +				} action_rss;
>>>>>>>>> +				unsigned int i;
>>>>>>>>> +				unsigned int j;
>>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>> +				sa->action[2].type = RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_END;
>>>>>>>>> +				/* Try RSS. */
>>>>>>>>> +				sa->action[1].type = RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_RSS;
>>>>>>>>> +				sa->action[1].conf = &action_rss;
>>>>>>>>> +				eth_dev = ctx->device;
>>>>>>>>> +				rte_eth_dev_rss_hash_conf_get(sa->portid,
>>>>>>>>> +							      &rss_conf);
>>>>>>>>> +				for (i = 0, j = 0;
>>>>>>>>> +				     i < eth_dev->data->nb_rx_queues; ++i)
>>>>>>>>> +					if (eth_dev->data->rx_queues[i])
>>>>>>>>> +						action_rss.local.queue[j++] = i;
>>>>>>>>> +				action_rss.local.num = j;
>>>>>>>>> +				action_rss.local.rss_conf = &rss_conf;
>>>>>>>>> +				ret = rte_flow_validate(sa->portid, &sa->attr,
>>>>>>>>> +							sa->pattern, sa->action,
>>>>>>>>> +							&err);
>>>>>>>>> +				if (!ret)
>>>>>>>>> +					goto flow_create;
>>>>>>>>> +				/* Try Queue. */
>>>>>>>>> +				sa->action[1].type = RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_QUEUE;
>>>>>>>>> +				sa->action[1].conf =
>>>>>>>>> +					&(struct rte_flow_action_queue){
>>>>>>>>> +					.index = 0,
>>>>>>>>> +				};
>>>>>>>>> +				ret = rte_flow_validate(sa->portid, &sa->attr,
>>>>>>>>> +							sa->pattern, sa->action,
>>>>>>>>> +							&err);
>>>>>>>>> +				if (ret)
>>>>>>>>> +					goto flow_create_failure;
>>>>>>>>> +			} else {
>>>>>>>>> +				sa->action[1].type =
>>>>>>>>> +					RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_PASSTHRU;
>>>>>>>>> +				sa->action[2].type = RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_END;
>>>>>>>> We would need flow validate here also. And, for egress, the application will
>>>>>>>> be able to set metadata (set_pkt_metadata API) per packet. So flow may not
>>>>>>>> be required for such cases. But if the flow create fails, the session create
>>>>>>>> would also fail. It might be better if we check whether the PMD would need
>>>>>>>> metadata (part of the sec_cap->ol_flags).
>>>>>>> Seems what you are describing is outside of this scope which is only
>>>>>>> related to correctly implement the generic flow API with terminal
>>>>>>> actions.
>>>>>> Since SECURITY+PASSTHRU won't be terminal, this code segment might be
>>>>>> misleading.
>>>>> Well, I don't mind adding an extra verification even if the create
>>>>> should fail if the validate fails, as there is no other option it
>>>>> is just like adding another if statement considering  the validate()
>>>>> cannot guarantee the flow will be created(), other errors like ENOMEM
>>>>> are still possible in the creation stage.
>>>> Good point. I was thinking of a scenario when flow for egress itself would
>>>> be optional.
>>>>>>> I'll suggest to add it in another patch.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Anyway, the flow validate is useful in the ingress to select the best
>>>>>>> behavior RSS/Queue, if the flow validate may fail, the flow create
>>>>>>> should also fail for the same reasons.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If the driver doesn't need metadata and the flow create fails, then
>>>>>>>> the create session should fail. Any thoughts?
>>>>>>> How the create_session() can fail without having all the informations
>>>>>>> (pattern, metadata, ...) the application wants to offload?
>>>>>> Is flow mandatory for the egress traffic? My understanding is, it's not.
>>>>>> "set_pkt_metadata" API gives application the ability to do the lookup and
>>>>>> pass the info along with the packet. In such cases, flow creation is not
>>>>>> necessary.
>>>>> Some NIC need to apply a flow rule for Egress and they don't need
>>>>> metadata for the packet.
>>>> Understood. In that case, what I proposed could be a separate patch. The
>>>> ingress path is proper with this patch, but we can keep egress open for
>>>> improvements.
>>> What do you mean with "keep egrees open for improvements"?
>> In egress side, this set of flow actions won't be having any terminating
>> action. And addition of PASSTHRU won't be required, as it will be implicit.
> Flow API does not define any behavior on Egress.  We have to define it.
Understood.
>
>> Creating flow for egress would allow hardware to perform the SA lookup. But
>> we cannot remove the lookup in application, as it's the SA which has the
>> information whether the packet need to be completely offloaded. Once this
>> lookup is done, this information could be communicated to hardware using the
>> set_pkt_metadata.
>>
>> This will eliminate the second lookup in the hardware. So
>> the flow could be optional. The current patch assumes flow is mandatory for
>> egress as well.
>> For Cavium hardware, egress side flow is not required and we will be using
>> "set_pkt_metadata" API. May be Radu can give his thoughts on this.
> Got it, what is missing here is a verification on the sa->ol_flags and
> only use the rte_flow for RTE_SECURITY_TX_HW_TRAILER_OFFLOAD as other NICs
> are using the RTE_SECURITY_TX_OLOAD_NEED_MDATA.
Precisely.
>
> Do you know why such difference is not hidden by the library?  It won't
> help application which will need to have different configuration path
> depending on the NIC capabilities.
I can only speculate the reasons. I think, application will have to know 
the NIC capabilities as the usage of rte_flow would be a one time 
configuration while using set_pkt_metadata would be per packet API call. 
If library is to hide this, it would incur unwanted checks in the data path.
>
>>>>>> I do agree that this is outside the scope of this patch, but I was just
>>>>>> curious about the behavior since you touched the topic.
>>>>>>>>> +			}
>>>>>>>>> +flow_create:
>>>>>>>>>       			sa->flow = rte_flow_create(sa->portid,
>>>>>>>>>       				&sa->attr, sa->pattern, sa->action, &err);
>>>>>>>>>       			if (sa->flow == NULL) {
>>>>>>>>> +flow_create_failure:
>>>>>>>>>       				RTE_LOG(ERR, IPSEC,
>>>>>>>>>       					"Failed to create ipsec flow msg: %s\n",
>>>>>>>>>       					err.message);
>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h
>>>>>>>>> index 775b316ff..3c367d392 100644
>>>>>>>>> --- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h
>>>>>>>>> +++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h
>>>>>>>>> @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ struct ipsec_sa {
>>>>>>>>>       	uint32_t ol_flags;
>>>>>>>>>       #define MAX_RTE_FLOW_PATTERN (4)
>>>>>>>>> -#define MAX_RTE_FLOW_ACTIONS (2)
>>>>>>>>> +#define MAX_RTE_FLOW_ACTIONS (3)
>>>>>>>>>       	struct rte_flow_item pattern[MAX_RTE_FLOW_PATTERN];
>>>>>>>>>       	struct rte_flow_action action[MAX_RTE_FLOW_ACTIONS];
>>>>>>>>>       	struct rte_flow_attr attr;
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
> Regards,
>



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