[dpdk-dev] [PATCH 1/4] ipsec: add AES-CTR algorithm support
Fan Zhang
roy.fan.zhang at intel.com
Mon Feb 18 17:32:51 CET 2019
This patch adds AES-CTR cipher algorithm support to ipsec
library.
Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang at intel.com>
---
lib/librte_ipsec/crypto.h | 17 ++++++
lib/librte_ipsec/sa.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
lib/librte_ipsec/sa.h | 18 +++++++
3 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/librte_ipsec/crypto.h b/lib/librte_ipsec/crypto.h
index b5f264831..4f551e39c 100644
--- a/lib/librte_ipsec/crypto.h
+++ b/lib/librte_ipsec/crypto.h
@@ -11,6 +11,16 @@
* by ipsec library.
*/
+/*
+ * AES-CTR counter block format.
+ */
+
+struct aesctr_cnt_blk {
+ uint32_t nonce;
+ uint64_t iv;
+ uint32_t cnt;
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
/*
* AES-GCM devices have some specific requirements for IV and AAD formats.
* Ideally that to be done by the driver itself.
@@ -41,6 +51,13 @@ struct gcm_esph_iv {
uint64_t iv;
} __attribute__((packed));
+static inline void
+aes_ctr_cnt_blk_fill(struct aesctr_cnt_blk *ctr, uint64_t iv, uint32_t nonce)
+{
+ ctr->nonce = nonce;
+ ctr->iv = iv;
+ ctr->cnt = rte_cpu_to_be_32(1);
+}
static inline void
aead_gcm_iv_fill(struct aead_gcm_iv *gcm, uint64_t iv, uint32_t salt)
diff --git a/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.c b/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.c
index 5f55c2a4e..e34dd320a 100644
--- a/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.c
+++ b/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.c
@@ -219,18 +219,28 @@ esp_inb_tun_init(struct rte_ipsec_sa *sa, const struct rte_ipsec_sa_prm *prm)
static void
esp_outb_init(struct rte_ipsec_sa *sa, uint32_t hlen)
{
+ uint8_t algo_type;
+
sa->sqn.outb.raw = 1;
/* these params may differ with new algorithms support */
sa->ctp.auth.offset = hlen;
sa->ctp.auth.length = sizeof(struct esp_hdr) + sa->iv_len + sa->sqh_len;
- if (sa->aad_len != 0) {
+
+ algo_type = sa->algo_type;
+
+ switch (algo_type) {
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_GCM:
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_CTR:
+ case ALGO_TYPE_NULL:
sa->ctp.cipher.offset = hlen + sizeof(struct esp_hdr) +
sa->iv_len;
sa->ctp.cipher.length = 0;
- } else {
+ break;
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_CBC:
sa->ctp.cipher.offset = sa->hdr_len + sizeof(struct esp_hdr);
sa->ctp.cipher.length = sa->iv_len;
+ break;
}
}
@@ -259,26 +269,47 @@ esp_sa_init(struct rte_ipsec_sa *sa, const struct rte_ipsec_sa_prm *prm,
RTE_IPSEC_SATP_MODE_MASK;
if (cxf->aead != NULL) {
- /* RFC 4106 */
- if (cxf->aead->algo != RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM)
+ switch (cxf->aead->algo) {
+ case RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM:
+ /* RFC 4106 */
+ sa->aad_len = sizeof(struct aead_gcm_aad);
+ sa->icv_len = cxf->aead->digest_length;
+ sa->iv_ofs = cxf->aead->iv.offset;
+ sa->iv_len = sizeof(uint64_t);
+ sa->pad_align = IPSEC_PAD_AES_GCM;
+ sa->algo_type = ALGO_TYPE_AES_GCM;
+ break;
+ default:
return -EINVAL;
- sa->aad_len = sizeof(struct aead_gcm_aad);
- sa->icv_len = cxf->aead->digest_length;
- sa->iv_ofs = cxf->aead->iv.offset;
- sa->iv_len = sizeof(uint64_t);
- sa->pad_align = IPSEC_PAD_AES_GCM;
+ }
} else {
sa->icv_len = cxf->auth->digest_length;
sa->iv_ofs = cxf->cipher->iv.offset;
sa->sqh_len = IS_ESN(sa) ? sizeof(uint32_t) : 0;
- if (cxf->cipher->algo == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_NULL) {
+
+ switch (cxf->cipher->algo) {
+ case RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_NULL:
sa->pad_align = IPSEC_PAD_NULL;
sa->iv_len = 0;
- } else if (cxf->cipher->algo == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CBC) {
+ sa->algo_type = ALGO_TYPE_NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CBC:
sa->pad_align = IPSEC_PAD_AES_CBC;
sa->iv_len = IPSEC_MAX_IV_SIZE;
- } else
+ sa->algo_type = ALGO_TYPE_AES_CBC;
+ break;
+
+ case RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CTR:
+ /* RFC 3686 */
+ sa->pad_align = IPSEC_PAD_AES_CTR;
+ sa->iv_len = IPSEC_AES_CTR_IV_SIZE;
+ sa->algo_type = ALGO_TYPE_AES_CTR;
+ break;
+
+ default:
return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
sa->udata = prm->userdata;
@@ -438,12 +469,15 @@ esp_outb_cop_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
{
struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sop;
struct aead_gcm_iv *gcm;
+ struct aesctr_cnt_blk *ctr;
+ uint8_t algo_type = sa->algo_type;
/* fill sym op fields */
sop = cop->sym;
- /* AEAD (AES_GCM) case */
- if (sa->aad_len != 0) {
+ switch (algo_type) {
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_GCM:
+ /* AEAD (AES_GCM) case */
sop->aead.data.offset = sa->ctp.cipher.offset + hlen;
sop->aead.data.length = sa->ctp.cipher.length + plen;
sop->aead.digest.data = icv->va;
@@ -455,14 +489,40 @@ esp_outb_cop_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
gcm = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(cop, struct aead_gcm_iv *,
sa->iv_ofs);
aead_gcm_iv_fill(gcm, ivp[0], sa->salt);
- /* CRYPT+AUTH case */
- } else {
+ break;
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_CBC:
+ /* Cipher-Auth (AES-CBC *) case */
+ sop->cipher.data.offset = sa->ctp.cipher.offset + hlen;
+ sop->cipher.data.length = sa->ctp.cipher.length + plen;
+ sop->auth.data.offset = sa->ctp.auth.offset + hlen;
+ sop->auth.data.length = sa->ctp.auth.length + plen;
+ sop->auth.digest.data = icv->va;
+ sop->auth.digest.phys_addr = icv->pa;
+ break;
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_CTR:
+ /* Cipher-Auth (AES-CTR *) case */
+ sop->cipher.data.offset = sa->ctp.cipher.offset + hlen;
+ sop->cipher.data.length = sa->ctp.cipher.length + plen;
+ sop->auth.data.offset = sa->ctp.auth.offset + hlen;
+ sop->auth.data.length = sa->ctp.auth.length + plen;
+ sop->auth.digest.data = icv->va;
+ sop->auth.digest.phys_addr = icv->pa;
+
+ ctr = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(cop, struct aesctr_cnt_blk *,
+ sa->iv_ofs);
+ aes_ctr_cnt_blk_fill(ctr, ivp[0], sa->salt);
+ break;
+ case ALGO_TYPE_NULL:
+ /* NULL case */
sop->cipher.data.offset = sa->ctp.cipher.offset + hlen;
sop->cipher.data.length = sa->ctp.cipher.length + plen;
sop->auth.data.offset = sa->ctp.auth.offset + hlen;
sop->auth.data.length = sa->ctp.auth.length + plen;
sop->auth.digest.data = icv->va;
sop->auth.digest.phys_addr = icv->pa;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
}
}
@@ -561,6 +621,7 @@ outb_pkt_xprepare(const struct rte_ipsec_sa *sa, rte_be64_t sqc,
{
uint32_t *psqh;
struct aead_gcm_aad *aad;
+ uint8_t algo_type = sa->algo_type;
/* insert SQN.hi between ESP trailer and ICV */
if (sa->sqh_len != 0) {
@@ -572,7 +633,7 @@ outb_pkt_xprepare(const struct rte_ipsec_sa *sa, rte_be64_t sqc,
* fill IV and AAD fields, if any (aad fields are placed after icv),
* right now we support only one AEAD algorithm: AES-GCM .
*/
- if (sa->aad_len != 0) {
+ if (algo_type == ALGO_TYPE_AES_GCM) {
aad = (struct aead_gcm_aad *)(icv->va + sa->icv_len);
aead_gcm_aad_fill(aad, sa->spi, sqc, IS_ESN(sa));
}
@@ -783,8 +844,10 @@ esp_inb_tun_cop_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
{
struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sop;
struct aead_gcm_iv *gcm;
+ struct aesctr_cnt_blk *ctr;
uint64_t *ivc, *ivp;
uint32_t clen;
+ uint8_t algo_type = sa->algo_type;
clen = plen - sa->ctp.cipher.length;
if ((int32_t)clen < 0 || (clen & (sa->pad_align - 1)) != 0)
@@ -793,8 +856,8 @@ esp_inb_tun_cop_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
/* fill sym op fields */
sop = cop->sym;
- /* AEAD (AES_GCM) case */
- if (sa->aad_len != 0) {
+ switch (algo_type) {
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_GCM:
sop->aead.data.offset = pofs + sa->ctp.cipher.offset;
sop->aead.data.length = clen;
sop->aead.digest.data = icv->va;
@@ -808,8 +871,8 @@ esp_inb_tun_cop_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
ivp = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mb, uint64_t *,
pofs + sizeof(struct esp_hdr));
aead_gcm_iv_fill(gcm, ivp[0], sa->salt);
- /* CRYPT+AUTH case */
- } else {
+ break;
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_CBC:
sop->cipher.data.offset = pofs + sa->ctp.cipher.offset;
sop->cipher.data.length = clen;
sop->auth.data.offset = pofs + sa->ctp.auth.offset;
@@ -822,7 +885,35 @@ esp_inb_tun_cop_prepare(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
ivp = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mb, uint64_t *,
pofs + sizeof(struct esp_hdr));
copy_iv(ivc, ivp, sa->iv_len);
+ break;
+ case ALGO_TYPE_AES_CTR:
+ sop->cipher.data.offset = pofs + sa->ctp.cipher.offset;
+ sop->cipher.data.length = clen;
+ sop->auth.data.offset = pofs + sa->ctp.auth.offset;
+ sop->auth.data.length = plen - sa->ctp.auth.length;
+ sop->auth.digest.data = icv->va;
+ sop->auth.digest.phys_addr = icv->pa;
+
+ /* copy iv from the input packet to the cop */
+ ctr = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(cop, struct aesctr_cnt_blk *,
+ sa->iv_ofs);
+ ivp = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mb, uint64_t *,
+ pofs + sizeof(struct esp_hdr));
+ aes_ctr_cnt_blk_fill(ctr, ivp[0], sa->salt);
+ break;
+ case ALGO_TYPE_NULL:
+ sop->cipher.data.offset = pofs + sa->ctp.cipher.offset;
+ sop->cipher.data.length = clen;
+ sop->auth.data.offset = pofs + sa->ctp.auth.offset;
+ sop->auth.data.length = plen - sa->ctp.auth.length;
+ sop->auth.digest.data = icv->va;
+ sop->auth.digest.phys_addr = icv->pa;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
}
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.h b/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.h
index 392e8fd7b..12c061ee6 100644
--- a/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.h
+++ b/lib/librte_ipsec/sa.h
@@ -15,10 +15,17 @@
enum {
IPSEC_PAD_DEFAULT = 4,
IPSEC_PAD_AES_CBC = IPSEC_MAX_IV_SIZE,
+ IPSEC_PAD_AES_CTR = IPSEC_PAD_DEFAULT,
IPSEC_PAD_AES_GCM = IPSEC_PAD_DEFAULT,
IPSEC_PAD_NULL = IPSEC_PAD_DEFAULT,
};
+/* iv sizes for different algorithms */
+enum {
+ IPSEC_IV_SIZE_DEFAULT = IPSEC_MAX_IV_SIZE,
+ IPSEC_AES_CTR_IV_SIZE = sizeof(uint64_t),
+};
+
/* these definitions probably has to be in rte_crypto_sym.h */
union sym_op_ofslen {
uint64_t raw;
@@ -47,7 +54,17 @@ struct replay_sqn {
__extension__ uint64_t window[0];
};
+/*IPSEC SA supported algorithms */
+enum sa_algo_type {
+ ALGO_TYPE_NULL = 0,
+ ALGO_TYPE_AES_CBC,
+ ALGO_TYPE_AES_CTR,
+ ALGO_TYPE_AES_GCM,
+ ALGO_TYPE_MAX
+};
+
struct rte_ipsec_sa {
+
uint64_t type; /* type of given SA */
uint64_t udata; /* user defined */
uint32_t size; /* size of given sa object */
@@ -65,6 +82,7 @@ struct rte_ipsec_sa {
union sym_op_ofslen auth;
} ctp;
uint32_t salt;
+ uint8_t algo_type;
uint8_t proto; /* next proto */
uint8_t aad_len;
uint8_t hdr_len;
--
2.14.5
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