[PATCH v2] examples/fips_validation: fix memory leak in sha test

[David Marchand]

On Sat, Jul 2, 2022 at 4:59 PM Gowrishankar Muthukrishnan
<gmuthukrishn at marvell.com> wrote:
>
> There is wrong size used for allocation of digest buffer which in
> some cases cause memory corruption. Also, fixed places where memory
> leak is observed. This fix would enable sha 384 and 512 NIST vectors
> be supported fully.
>
> Fixes: 93d797d94f1 ("examples/fips_validation: add parsing for sha")

This sha1 is not valid anymore, or maybe Akhil will squash the fix in
the next-crypto tree before reaching main.

>
> Signed-off-by: Gowrishankar Muthukrishnan <gmuthukrishn at marvell.com>
> ---
> v2:
>  - doc update to support 384 and 512 sha.
> ---
>  doc/guides/sample_app_ug/fips_validation.rst   |  2 +-
>  examples/fips_validation/fips_validation_sha.c | 10 ++++++++--
>  examples/fips_validation/main.c                |  1 +
>  3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/doc/guides/sample_app_ug/fips_validation.rst b/doc/guides/sample_app_ug/fips_validation.rst
> index 4b68226665..6f4bd34726 100644
> --- a/doc/guides/sample_app_ug/fips_validation.rst
> +++ b/doc/guides/sample_app_ug/fips_validation.rst
> @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ ACVP
>      * AES-CMAC (128,192,256) - AFT
>      * AES-XTS (128,256) - AFT
>      * HMAC (SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512)
> -    * SHA (1,256) - AFT, MCT
> +    * SHA (1, 256, 384, 512) - AFT, MCT
>
>
>  Application Information
> diff --git a/examples/fips_validation/fips_validation_sha.c b/examples/fips_validation/fips_validation_sha.c
> index a2928618d7..538cb6647a 100644
> --- a/examples/fips_validation/fips_validation_sha.c
> +++ b/examples/fips_validation/fips_validation_sha.c
> @@ -229,13 +229,19 @@ parse_test_sha_json_algorithm(void)
>         for (i = 0; i < RTE_DIM(phsc); i++) {
>                 if (info.interim_info.sha_data.algo == phsc[i].algo) {
>                         vec.cipher_auth.digest.len = atoi(phsc[i].str);
> -                       vec.cipher_auth.digest.val = calloc(0, vec.cipher_auth.digest.len * 8);
> +                       if (vec.cipher_auth.digest.val)
> +                               free(vec.cipher_auth.digest.val);

Unneeded if().

We just did a tree-wide cleanup to avoid these.
Please don't reintroduce some.


> +
> +                       vec.cipher_auth.digest.val = calloc(1, vec.cipher_auth.digest.len);

Don't we need to check for allocation success?


>                         break;
>                 }
>         }
>
> -       if (i == RTE_DIM(phsc))
> +       if (i == RTE_DIM(phsc)) {
> +               free(vec.cipher_auth.digest.val);
> +               vec.cipher_auth.digest.val = NULL;
>                 return -1;
> +       }
>
>         return 0;
>  }


-- 
David Marchand