patch 'crypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparison' has been queued to stable release 25.11.3

Siraj L sirajluthfi at gmail.com
Thu Jul 30 13:30:10 CEST 2026


Hi,

Thank you for fixing and backporting the issue.
I wanted to ask whether Bugzilla #1773 (timing-safe digest comparison in
crypto/uadk) is planned to receive a CVE identifier or security advisory.
Since this is a timing side-channel in cryptographic authentication
verification, I was wondering whether it would be tracked as a CVE.

Thanks,

Siraj Luthfi Ananda


On Thu, 30 Jul 2026 at 16.19 Kevin Traynor <ktraynor at redhat.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> FYI, your patch has been queued to stable release 25.11.3
>
> Note it hasn't been pushed to http://dpdk.org/browse/dpdk-stable yet.
> It will be pushed if I get no objections before 08/04/26. So please
> shout if anyone has objections.
>
> Also note that after the patch there's a diff of the upstream commit vs the
> patch applied to the branch. This will indicate if there was any rebasing
> needed to apply to the stable branch. If there were code changes for
> rebasing
> (ie: not only metadata diffs), please double check that the rebase was
> correctly done.
>
> Queued patches are on a temporary branch at:
> https://github.com/kevintraynor/dpdk-stable
>
> This queued commit can be viewed at:
>
> https://github.com/kevintraynor/dpdk-stable/commit/1248b5128c68aeac35878cdd41ae11396f3d4a4d
>
> Thanks.
>
> Kevin
>
> ---
> From 1248b5128c68aeac35878cdd41ae11396f3d4a4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen at networkplumber.org>
> Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 11:59:25 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH] crypto/uadk: use timing-safe digest comparison
> MIME-Version: 1.0
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
>
> [ upstream commit 8051903e5727a85897fd83f19a591bb3b743c5d4 ]
>
> Digest verification used memcmp() to compare the computed and
> expected MAC. memcmp() returns as soon as the first differing byte
> is found, so its run time depends on how many leading bytes match.
> An attacker submitting forged digests can use that timing signal to
> recover the correct value one byte at a time.
>
> Use rte_memeq_timingsafe(), whose run time depends only on the
> length, for the verify comparison.
>
> Bugzilla ID: 1773
> Fixes: aba5b230ca04 ("crypto/uadk: use async mode")
>
> Reported-by: Siraj Luthfi Ananda <sirajluthfi at gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen at networkplumber.org>
> Acked-by: Morten Brørup <mb at smartsharesystems.com>
> ---
>  .mailmap                              | 1 +
>  drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c | 4 ++--
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/.mailmap b/.mailmap
> index bc54e58586..b84214567d 100644
> --- a/.mailmap
> +++ b/.mailmap
> @@ -1546,4 +1546,5 @@ Simon Kuenzer <simon.kuenzer at neclab.eu>
>  Sinan Kaya <okaya at kernel.org>
>  Siobhan Butler <siobhan.a.butler at intel.com>
> +Siraj Luthfi Ananda <sirajluthfi at gmail.com>
>  Sirshak Das <sirshak.das at arm.com>
>  Sivaprasad Tummala <sivaprasad.tummala at amd.com> <
> sivaprasad.tummala at intel.com>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c
> b/drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c
> index 3c4e83e56f..221ad546da 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/uadk/uadk_crypto_pmd.c
> @@ -1112,6 +1112,6 @@ uadk_crypto_dequeue_burst(void *queue_pair, struct
> rte_crypto_op **ops,
>                         uint8_t *dst = qp->temp_digest[i % BURST_MAX];
>
> -                       if (memcmp(dst, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
> -                                  sess->auth.digest_length) != 0)
> +                       if (!rte_memeq_timingsafe(dst,
> op->sym->auth.digest.data,
> +
>  sess->auth.digest_length))
>                                 op->status =
> RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
>                 }
> --
> 2.55.0
>
> ---
>   Diff of the applied patch vs upstream commit (please double-check if
> non-empty:
> ---
> --- -   2026-07-30 10:16:03.233113859 +0100
> +++ 0061-crypto-uadk-use-timing-safe-digest-comparison.patch    2026-07-30
> 10:16:01.491971496 +0100
> @@ -1 +1 @@
> -From 8051903e5727a85897fd83f19a591bb3b743c5d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From 1248b5128c68aeac35878cdd41ae11396f3d4a4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> @@ -8,0 +9,2 @@
> +[ upstream commit 8051903e5727a85897fd83f19a591bb3b743c5d4 ]
> +
> @@ -20 +21,0 @@
> -Cc: stable at dpdk.org
> @@ -31 +32 @@
> -index 0e57de0afe..e85a38c560 100644
> +index bc54e58586..b84214567d 100644
> @@ -34 +35 @@
> -@@ -1565,4 +1565,5 @@ Simon Kuenzer <simon.kuenzer at neclab.eu>
> +@@ -1546,4 +1546,5 @@ Simon Kuenzer <simon.kuenzer at neclab.eu>
>
>
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